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I. INTRODUCTION
n recent years,' the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) has succeeded in
eliminating a number of tax-sheltering mechanisms by employing both
changes in the tax laws2 and zealous-some would say overzeal-
ous-enforcement of tax law interpretations. While some of these mecha-
nisms may have been abusive,' others which were harmless and produc-
tive have also fallen victim to the wholesale assault.4 In July of 1982, with
the Tax Court's decision in Keller v. Commissioner,5 one of the most
In 1973, the National Office of the I.R.S. began its Coordinated Program for Examina-
tion of the Oil and Gas Drilling Industry. This program was later expanded to include tax
shelters in the areas of farm operations, real estate, and motion pictures. Carter & Parrott,
IRS Targets "Abusive" Oil and Gas and Other Tax Shelter Investments as "Litigating
Vehicles," 29 OIL & GAS TAX Q. 319, 320 (1980).
2 The most notable change in the tax laws came with the enactment of the Tax Reform
Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, 90 Stat. 1520 (1976) (codified at scattered sections of titles
5, 7, 15, 19, 26, 29, 42 & 46 U.S.C. (1982)).
' The IRS Tax Shelters Examination Handbook defines an abusive tax shelter as "one in
which the present value of all future income is less than the present value of all the invest-
ments and associated costs in the shelter." [1982 Index] STAND. FED. TAX REP. (CCH)
351(7), at 8567. "The Handbook covers motion pictures, real estate, farming, oil and gas,
coal, equipment leasing, and commodity options and futures, and outlines the principal is-
sues raised in such transactions and an exposition of the applicable law." R. HAFT &
P. FASS, 1982 TAX SHELTERED INVESTMENTS HANDBOOK 475.
" "Tax shelter cases now dominate the time of the Tax Court. [These cases] involve $5
billion in possible disallowances, 25,000 tax shelters under attack and 200,000 taxpayers who
will be affected." Jacobowitz, Tax Shelters-Current Issues, Practice and Trends, 39 INST.
ON FED. TAX'N intro. chs. 22-25 (1980).
5 79 T.C. 7 (1982) (holding, under standards not previously applied to the IDC area, that
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widespread and traditionally favored tax-shelter vehicles,6 the oil and gas
exploratory7 drilling fund, was placed on the endangered species list, its
ultimate fate as yet undeterminable. The Keller court held that a cash-
basis taxpayer could not currently deduct expenditures made at year-end
as payments for intangible drilling and development costs (IDC) to be
incurred in the following year, because the allowance of such a deduction
would, in the opinion of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue (the Com-
missioner) and the Keller court, result in a material distortion of income.'
II. GENERAL BACKGROUND
The typical tax shelter is comprised of three elements: 1) conversion of
ordinary income into capital gain; 2) leverage; and 3) deferral.9 Conver-
sion occurs "when [a] capital gain is realized on the sale or other disposi-
tion of an asset, which gain was created by accelerated deductions taken
against ordinary income. ' Leveraging is the principle whereby an "in-
vestor uses borrowed funds to pay expenses for which current deductions
are received."'" Deferral, which is of primary importance for the purposes
of this Note, occurs when deductions are accelerated, thereby reducing
the tax liability of investors in the initial year or two of the program and
"resulting in an interest-free loan from the government until the shelter
reverses.'12
During its heyday, the oil and gas drilling limited partnership provided
investors with the opportunity to take advantage of each of these ele-
ments. First, the gain or loss on the sale of a limited partner's interest in
a drilling program was treated as a long-term capital gain or loss, pro-
vided, of course, the partner had held his interest for more than twelve
months. This successfully converted his initial investment, which might
the IDC prepaid by a limited partnership could not be deducted in the year of payment, but
would have to await the year the services were actually rendered).
' The real estate tax shelter is the most abundant, but "the second most common source
of tax-oriented investments is oil and gas drilling operations." Pineo, Tax-oriented Invest-
ments: The Current Trend, 39 INST. ON FED. TAX'N § 22.00, at 22-7 (1980).
An "exploratory" drilling program is composed of a relatively high percentage of proper-
ties which are unproven, in comparison with "development" or "income" drilling programs,
which involve less of a gamble for investors. "Exploratory" programs provide investors
"with greater tax benefits and greater opportunity for growth, at greater risk, than a 'devel-
opment' or 'income' fund." Klueger, Deductibility of "Prepaid" Intangible Drilling and De-
velopment Costs, 30 OIL & GAS TAX Q. 431 (1982). See R. HAr & P. FASS, supra note 3,
at 251.
8 79 T.C. at 41.
Harrell & Stricof, Overview of an Oil and Gas Tax Shelter, 28 OIL & GAS TAX Q. 496,
496 (1980).
10 Id.
11 Id.
12 Id.
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have been taxable as ordinary income,"3 into an investment amenable to
capital gains treatment. Second, one of the principal means of taking ad-
vantage of leveraging prior to 1972 was through the use of nonrecourse
loans by the general partner or by an outside lender to the limited part-
ners for investment in the drilling program. These "leveraged" drilling
programs frequently offered five dollars or more of deductions for each
dollar of investment.' 4 Third, deductions could be accelerated by the use
of the special treatment afforded IDC by congressional mandate. The In-
ternal Revenue Code (I.R.C. or Code) directs the Secretary to prescribe
regulations granting "the option to deduct as expenses intangible drilling
and development costs in the case of oil and gas wells.' 5 The Secretary
has complied with this directive and has promulgated a treasury regula-
tion which provides that "intangible drilling and development costs in-
curred by an operator . . . in the development of oil and gas properties
may at his option be chargeable to capital or expense. This option applies
to all expenditures . . . for wages, fuel, repairs, hauling, supplies, etc.,
incident to and necessary for the drilling . . . and the preparation 1 6 of
oil and gas wells.
By the proper exercise of this option, IDC, which are the major ex-
penses incurred in any oil and gas drilling program,'1 7 can be written off
against current income ("expensed"), as opposed to being capitalized and
depreciated. This results in substantially lower after-tax costs in drilling
oil and gas wells.' 8 Treasury regulations provide that the option to ex-
pense IDC "may be exercised by claiming intangible drilling and develop-
ment costs as a deduction on the taxpayer's return for the first taxable
year in which the taxpayer pays or incurs such costs."' 9 The Secretary's
use of the phrase "pays or incurs" creates one of the more controversial
tax shelter features of oil and gas drilling programs, because for "the in-
vestor seeking to shelter income . . . the key feature is the ability of the
"3 Provided the investment is made at the end of the taxable year using money which
would be includable as ordinary income on the taxpayer's federal income tax return and
provided the taxpayer has invested in a program in which his distributive share of partner-
ship losses is equal to or greater than the amount of his initial investment, the net effect of
the transaction will be to shelter the initial investment from federal income taxation during
the life of the shelter. When it is finally taxed at the time the taxpayer's interest is liqui-
dated, the investment will, at least in part, be taxed at the capital gains rate, which is pres-
ently a maximum of twenty percent. See infra text accompanying note 21 for further
clarification.
" See Pennell, Alleviating the At-Risk Rules, 29 TUL. TAX INST. 1 (1979).
" I.R.C. § 263(c) (1982).
" Treas. Reg. § 1.612-4(a) (1966).
"7 It has been estimated that, on the average, "these costs represent upwards of 70% of
the total cost of a well." Webb, Petroleum Tax Policy, Controls and the Energy Crisis, 22
OIL & GAs TAX Q. 203, 229 (1974).
I8 /d.
Treas. Reg. § 1.612-4(d) (1965) (emphasis added).
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program to incur and expense IDC in the earliest possible year. [So,] for
the investor who must shelter income in a given tax year . . . the ability
to deduct IDC in the year of investment . . ., through 'prepaid' IDC"20 is
the key investment criterion, for it is the use of prepaid IDC which per-
mits an investor to write off most, if not all, of his investment in the year
of investment.
Subsequent to the idyllic days of its inception, the oil and gas drilling
fund tax shelter endured a series of assaults. First, due to changes in the
tax laws, "the portion of any gain which is attributable to the partner's
share of recapture of IDC, to depreciation recapture on equipment, or to
any other unrealized receivables and any other substantially appreciated
property held by the partnership as a dealer will generally be treated as
ordinary income ' 21 upon the disposition of partnership interests.
Second, in 1972, the IRS ruled that nonrecourse loans by the general
partner to the limited partners, while constituting an addition to the in-
terest of the general partner, did not increase the basis of the limited
partners.2 2 Then, in 1976, the use of nonrecourse loans was totally fore-
closed as a leveraging mechanism for oil and gas exploration activities.2 3
As part of the Tax Reform Act of 1976, Congress enacted the "at risk"
rules under I.R.C. section 465. These rules limited allowable losses to the
total amount the investor has "at risk" in the venture at the end of the
taxable year.2 4 The amount of allowable deductions for any particular
limited partner in an oil and gas limited partnership is presently limited
to "the amount of money or property invested in the activity, funds bor-
rowed with personal recourse and invested in the partnership or activity,
or loans for which the investor has pledged property other than that of
the activity involved."" In the event that a limited partner's distributive
share of loss exceeds his adjusted basis, any "[d]isallowed losses are de-
ductible in the next succeeding year in which the amount 'at risk' in the
20 Klueger, supra note 7, at 431. An expense will generally be considered prepaid when
"paid in a taxable year prior to the taxable year prior to the taxable year in which the
benefits therefrom are received; nondeductibility of a prepaid expense is based on the as-
sumption that expense in a fixed amount can be directly associated with the benefit to be
received in a future year." Texas Instruments, Inc. v. United States, 551 F.2d 599 (5th Cir.
1977).
1 R. HAFT & P. FAss, supra note 3, at 251. For the specific provisions dealing with the
share of recapture attributable to an individual partner, see I.R.C. § 1254 (1982).
22 Rev. Rul. 135, 1972-1 C.B. 200.
2 I.R.C. § 465(c)(1) (1982). In addition to "exploring for, or exploiting, oil and gas re-
sources," I.R.C. § 465 also applies to "(A) holding, producing or distributing motion pic-
ture films or video tapes, (B) farming ... , (C) leasing any section 1245 property . ..
[and] . . . (E) exploring for, exploiting, geothermal deposits." I.R.C. § 465(c)(1) (1982). See
also note 1 supra.
24 Any loss disallowed because it exceeds this amount can be deducted in the next taxable
year, subject to the same limitation. See I.R.C. § 465(a)(2) (1982).
2 Harrell & Stricof, supra note 9, at 508.
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activity is increased above zero, and may be carried forward
indefinitely.'26
Third, the deferral aspect of the oil and gas drilling tax shelter, though
previously the least assaulted, likewise did not go unassailed, even prior
to Keller. The Tax Reform Act of 1976, while not directly attacking the
IDC option, "diminishe[d] the value of the resulting tax deferral by ad-
ding 'excess' IDC to the list of tax preference items upon which the mini-
mum tax is imposed.1
7
Despite its embattled past, the typical oil and gas drilling fund is much
the same in structure now as it has always been. Generally, in a proposed
drilling fund, subscriptions are offered by the corporation which will
serve as the managing general partner through various investment-ori-
ented companies.2 8 The program is usually structured as a single-tier or a
two-tier limited partnership2 and is targeted at investors in the higher
tax brackets.
There are several advantages in utilizing the limited partnership struc-
ture which help to account for its popularity among drilling funds. First,
it allows for the pooling of capital by many smaller investors. With their
capital pooled, the group can enter into a more diversified program which
no one alone could have undertaken, thereby spreading the risk inherent
in wildcat drilling ventures.3 0
Second, a limited partnership has the advantage of permitting tax ben-
efits to be passed on directly to the individual investor s ' on a "functional
26 R. HAFT & P. FASS, supra note 3, at 438.
27 Glickman & DeBerry, Post-1976 Oil and Gas Operations Will Require Careful Plan-
ning to Overcome Adverse Effects, 46 J. TAX'N 230, 230 (1977); see I.R.C. § 57(a)(11)
(1982). For a good discussion of the minimum tax and the alternative minimum tax, see
R. HAFT & P. FASS, supra note 3, at 278-81.
28 Generally, brokerage firms and those engaged in tax advisory functions account for the
majority of subscription sales.
" In multi-state operations, two-tier partnerships are being used with great success to
alleviate the problems of burdensome registration and filing requirements." Record, Financ-
ing Oil and Gas Exploration, 24 INST. ON OIL & GAs L. & TAX'N, 111, 121-22 (1973).
30 "According to data reported by the American Association of Petroleum Geologists, only
one out of every sixty new field wildcats discovers a significant field . . . Furthermore,
even a significant discovery can be a financial loss, or only marginally profitable, because of
high exploration and development costs." Webb, supra note 17, at 211.
" In a limited partnership which is treated as such for federal income tax purposes, each
limited partner reports his distributive share of partnership income, loss, credit, etc., on his
personal tax return. On the other hand, if the IRS were to classify the partnership as an
association, the entity would be taxed as a corporation and the partners would be treated as
its shareholders. Under these circumstances, any distributions from the partnership would
be taxable to the limited partners as dividends, and partnership income, loss, etc. could not
be passed through to the limited partners. For a full discussion, see Treas. Reg.
§§ 301.7701.2, 301.7701.3. For cases dealing with challenging partnership status, see Larson
v. Commissioner, 65 T.C. 159 (1975), later withdrawn and reissued against the Commis-
sioner on Apr. 27, 1976 in 66 T.C. 159; Zuckman v. United States, 524 F.2d 729 (Ct. Cl.
1975).
1983-841
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allocation" basis. In this system, "the general partner usually contributes
the leases and possibly tangible equipment costs, and the limited partners
make cash contributions to the partnership. The limited partners are al-
located the intangible drilling costs, while capitalized costs are allocated
to the general partner. 3 2 The IRS first stated its position regarding allo-
cations of IDC in Revenue Ruling 68-139,"3 which provides that the allo-
cation should be allowed "unless examination discloses that the principal
purpose of the allocation is the avoidance or evasion of Federal income
tax.""
Third, while the use of a limited partnership has the sometimes unde-
sirable characteristic of limiting the amount of allowable deductions," it
also, by definition, has the desirable characteristic of limiting the liability
of the individual investors to the amount each has actually invested in
the venture-or to some other specified amount if financing mechanisms
are utilized.
III. HISTORY OF IDC DEDUCTIBILITY
Primarily because oil and gas exploration activities involve an ex-
tremely high risk of loss," "[s]ince 1917-or virtually since the inception
of the federal income tax laws-the operator of an oil and gas property
has been afforded an election either to deduct or to capitalize the intangi-
ble costs associated with drilling and developing the property."3 Due to
the high risk involved in oil and gas drilling ventures "one of the impor-
tant motivating factors in inducing investors to contribute capital to
funds is the 'up-front' deduction through the use of IDC."38
The enactment of provisions granting the option to expense IDC,, as
opposed to capitalizing it and recovering it over a number of years, did
not at first necessarily mean that a taxpayer using the cash receipts and
3' Harrell & Stricof, supra note 9, at 501.
33 1968-1 C.B. 311 (ruling that the provisions of the partnership agreement relating to the
allocation of IDC will govern if a proper election is made under Treas. Reg. §§ 1.703-
1(b)(1), 1.612-4).
4 Id. at 312. See also Orrisch v. Commissioner, 55 T.C. 395 (1970), aff'd per curiam, 9th
Cir., unpublished (special allocation of depreciation of two apartment houses by amendment
to the partnership agreement held to have been undertaken principally for tax avoidance
purposes); I.R.C. § 704, as amended by the Tax Reform Act of 1976 (providing that alloca-
tions will be recognized for income tax purposes unless they do not have "substantial eco-
nomic effect"); Attermeier, The Crude Oil Windfall Profits Tax of 1980: How It Will Affect
Oil Companies, 52 J. TAX'N 264 (1980) (dealing in part with the IRS repudiation of the
liberal stance it had adopted in Rev. Rul. 68-139).
31 See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
" See supra note 30.
37 Baum, Intangible Drilling and Development Costs: Some Recurring Problems, 21 INST.
ON OIL & GAS L. & TAX'N 337 (1970).
" Klein, Tax Shelter from Tax Reform, 25 OIL & GAS TAX Q. 163, 179 (1976).
" See supra notes 15-16 and accompanying text.
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disbursements method of accounting could deduct IDC in the year in
which they were paid. Because I.R.C. section 263(c) did not speak di-
rectly to the timing of the deduction, the early position of the IRS was
that "IDC prepaid by a taxpayer, who keeps his accounts and files his
returns on the cash basis and elects to treat such costs as expenses, con-
stitute an allowable deduction only for the taxable year in which the drill-
ing and developing services are actually rendered.' '40 So, while I.R.C. sec-
tion 162 permits expenses to be deducted in the year payment is made by
a cash-basis taxpayer,"' the position of the IRS was that in order to be
currently deductible, IDC must have been both incurred and paid and, in
addition, the taxpayer must already have received the benefits of the
transaction. 42
The initial treatment accorded IDC prepayments was identical to treat-
ment of prepaid insurance by the IRS. In Commissioner u. Boylston Mar-
ket Association,8 it was held that a cash-basis taxpayer which bought
insurance policies covering periods of three and more years could deduct
only the pro rata portion of the prepaid premiums attributable to each
year."' In other words, the taxpayer should deduct the expense only in
the year that it paid for and received its bargained-for benefit.
Though current deductibility of prepaid IDC was ostensibly precluded
by Revenue Ruling 53-170,"' that issue was not presented to the Tax
Court until 1963. Pauley v. United States"" involved a taxpayer who had
executed a written contract with a drilling company on December 31,
1947 and had paid the driller $95,000 as "payment for work to be per-
formed and materials to be furnished""' as IDC under the agreement.
Drilling commenced in January, 1948, and the taxpayer took a deduction
for the full amount paid on his 1947 federal income tax return. The IRS
ruled that the taxpayer was required to deduct the prepaid IDC in the
year the work was actually performed, rather than in the year of pay-
ment.'8 The district court disagreed with the IRS, however, and held that
the "prepayment of the intangible drilling expenses was both an 'ordi-
nary' and a 'necessary' expense under Section 23(a)(1)(A) of the Internal
Revenue Code of 1939, [and] fully deductible in the year of pay-
ment. . . ."" The taxpayer was allowed to deduct the prepaid IDC de-
spite the fact that in the view of the Commissioner a distortion of income
4 Rev. Rul. 170, 1953-2 C.B. 141, 141.
" I.R.C. § 162(a) (1982).
" 1953-2 C.B. at 142.
" 131 F.2d 966 (1st Cir. 1942).
" Id. at 966.
4 1953-2 C.B. 141.
40 63-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 1 9280 (S.D. Cal. 1963).
Id. at 87,652.
48 Id.
" Id. at 87, 656.
1983-84]
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resulted.50 The two diametrically opposed positions, the Pauley court's
position and the position taken by the Commissioner in Revenue Rul-
ing 53-170, could never be reconciled, so the Pauley court dismissed Rev-
enue Ruling 53-170 as being of no more binding force than "the opinion
of any other lawyer."
5
'
It was not until eight years after the Pauley decision that the IRS for-
mally acquiesced in the court's position regarding current-year deduct-
ibility. In 1971, the Commissioner issued two rulings5' which seemed to
settle the issue that IDC "paid under a contract by a cash-basis taxpayer
who elected in a prior year to treat such costs as expenses, are deductible
in the year paid even though work is performed in the following year."5
Revenue Ruling 71-25254 involved a taxpayer who, on December 31,
1969, paid for work which was performed in 1970. The taxpayer deducted
the entire payment as an expense on his 1969 federal income tax return
pursuant to the I.R.C. section 263(c) option.5 5 The full amount of the
prepayment was allowed as a deduction for 1969 because "the circum-
stances . . . show[ed] that the taxpayer, as a result of a bonafide transac-
tion, was obligated to pay the amount of IDC at the times specified in
the drilling contract."5 6 In contrast, Revenue Ruling 71-57957 provided
that IDC "paid by a cash-basis taxpayer in a taxable year prior to the
year in which payment is required under a drilling contract are not de-
ductible in that year."58 This latter Revenue Ruling involved a taxpayer
who, although obligated to pay only upon completion of the well in 1971,
voluntarily prepaid $50,000 during 1970 and deducted this amount on his
federal income tax return for that year.
59
Viewed together, these two rulings appeared to necessitate a binding
contractual obligation to prepay the IDC at the time payment is in fact
made as the prerequisite to current-year deductibility. Even as late as
1982, the Commissioner advised that prepaid IDC was deductible in the
year in which the taxpayer was legally obligated to make the
50 See I.R.C. § 446(b) (1982); see infra text accompanying notes 131-39.
63-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 9280, at 87,657. While it is true that revenue rulings are
not binding on the Commissioner, they are in many instances the best guidance available to
tax attorneys and taxpayers. Section 601.201(a)(5) of the Statement of Procedural Rules
"describes a revenue ruling as the official interpretation by the Internal Revenue Service,
published for the information and guidance of taxpayers and Internal Revenue Service offi-
cials." Keller v. Commissioner, 79 T.C. 7 (1982) (emphasis added).
12 See Rev. Rul. 252, 1971-1 C.B. 146; Rev. Rul. 579, 1971-2 C.B. 225.
53 Rev. Rul. 252, 1971-1 C.B. 146, 146 (emphasis added).
1971-1 C.B. 146.
15 Id. at 146.
" Id. at 147 (emphasis added).
57 1971-2 C.B. 225.
" Id. at 225 (emphasis added).
59 ¥TA
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prepayments.6"
A binding obligation to prepay the IDC did not stand as the sole re-
quirement for current-year deductibility, however. Both prior and subse-
quent IRS rulings and court decisions established what, at least before
Keller, seemed to be relatively firm structural guidelines for allowing the
prepayment of IDC to be deducted in the year of payment. These re-
quirements for allowance of the deduction for prepaid IDC in the year of
payment are: 1) the taxpayer seeking to exercise the I.R.C. section 263(c)
option must have held a working or operating interest;6' 2) the taxpayer
must have possessed the operating interest at the time the expense was
incurred; 62 3) the amount of the prepaid IDC must have been determined
in an arm's-length transaction; 63 4) the payment for IDC required under
a contract must have been made to the drilling contractor who would ac-
tually perform the work;64 5) any contractual obligation to prepay the
IDC must have been binding on all owners of the operating interest;65
6) there must have been a legitimate business purpose for the prepay-
ment requirement;66 7) the prepayment of IDC must have satisfied the
limitations of Treasury Regulation section 1.461-1(a)(1)67 meeting the
1o Letter Ruling 8226135, [Private Letter Rulings] Fed. Taxes (P-H) § 4145 (1982).
"l See Treas. Reg. § 1.612-4 (1965); see also Rev. Rul. 176, 1977-1 C.B. 77 (driller re-
ceives an assignment of the entire working interest in the drill site and an undivided frac-
tion in the remainder of the tract from lessee of the land); Rev. Rul. 207, 1971-1 C.B. 160
(carrying party owns entire interest until it recoups one-half of drilling and completion
costs; thereafter it owns an undivided one-fourth interest); Rev. Rul. 657, 1970-2 C.B. 70
(taxpayer who owns one-half interest has option to charge one-half of the IDC); Rev.
Rul. 336, 1970-1 C.B. 145 (taxpayer whose operating interest is subject to a retained over-
riding royalty that may be converted to a 50% operating interest); Rev. Rul. 332, 1969-1
C.B. 87 (taxpayer who owns less than a full operating interest but who is entitled to receive
the entire interest income until recoupment of his expenditures); Rev. Rul. 34, 1967-1 C.B.
72 (taxpayer who holds the working or operating interest in oil and gas properties has the
option to capitalize or expense the IDC).
" See Rev. Rul. 304, 1975-2 C.B. 94; Rev. Rul. 71, 1980-1 C.B. 210; Letter Ruling
8226135, [Private Letter Rulings] Fed. Taxes (P-H) 4145 (1982); Letter Ruling 8111055,
[Private Letter Rulings] Fed. Taxes (P-H) 3792 (1981); see also Phillips v. United States,
233 F. Supp. 59 (E.D. Tex. 1964), aff'd 66-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 9157 (5th Cir. 1965)(payments not deductible as IDC since taxpayer was not operator of well); Platt v. Commis-
sioner, 207 F.2d 697 (7th Cir. 1953) (payments not deductible as IDC).
Rev. Rul. 211, 1973-1 C.B. 303.
See Rev. Rul. 71, 1980-1 C.B. 210; Letter Ruling 8012060, [Private Letter Rulings]
Fed. Taxes (P-H) 1 3524 (1980).
6 Letter Ruling 8012060, [Private Letter Rulings] Fed. Taxes (P-H) % 3524 (1980).
Compare Pauley v. United States, 63-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) T 9280 (S.D. Cal. 1963)
(prepayment of IDC allowed as a deduction) and Stradlings Building Materials, Inc. v.
Commissioner, 76 T.C. 84 (1981) (prepayment of IDC allowed despite failure of contractor
to perform services in subsequent year) with Rev. Rul. 71, 1980-1 C.B. 210 (IDC prepay-
ments by a partnership to a partner are not deductible until paid to the independent
contractors).
17 Rev. Rul. 71, 1980-1 C.B. 106. This section proscribes the full deduction of an expen-
diture which results in the creation of an asset having a useful life which extends substan-
9Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1983
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"clear reflection of income" standard of I.R.C. section 446(b);"s 8) the
contracts should have specified the locations of the wells to be drilled;
9
and 9) the contracts should have provided that the drilling be accom-
plished within a reasonable time.
7 0
Thus, IRS rulings and judicial interpretation of prepaid IDC deduct-
ibility had combined to develop a sizable body of authority prior to the
dramatic reassessment of existing law by the court in Keller.
IV. THE FACTS OF KELLER
In 1973, the Kellers acquired a $50,000 interest in an oil and gas drill-
ing program which involved a group of related entities. The sponsor,
Amarex, Inc. (Amarex), was a publicly held company which had been in-
volved in oil and gas exploration and development since 1968.71 Amarex
Funds of Delaware, Inc. (Amarex Funds), was incorporated in 1970 as a
wholly owned subsidiary of Amarex. Amarex Drilling Program, Ltd.-72/73
(the Program Partnership) was formed in October of 1972 as a limited
partnership, and it invested as a limited partner in four drilling partner-
ships engaged in the exploration for and production of oil and gas.
Amarex and Amarex Funds were the general partners in both tiers of lim-
ited partnerships, with Amarex Funds serving as the Program Partner-
ship's manager and the drilling partnership's operator.
7
2
Investors, like the Kellers, who purchased five or more $1,000 units of
participation became limited partners in the Program Partnership. The
Program Partnership did not acquire oil and gas properties or actively
engage in any drilling-related activities, but instead reinvested the inves-
tors' money in the four drilling partnerships which conducted the oil and
gas operations .
7
The rights and obligations of the parties were governed by two agree-
tially beyond the close of the taxable year. See infra text accompanying notes 183-87 for a
detailed discussion of this issue.
" Rev. Rul. 71, 1980-1 C.B. 106. This limitation and its interplay with the Commis-
sioner's power under Treas. Reg. § 1.461-1 is probably the single most important aspect of
IDC current-year deductibility. See infra text accompanying notes 119-74, for a detailed
discussion.
09 Letter Ruling 8111055, [Private Letter Rulings] Fed. Taxes (P-H) 1 3792 (1981).
70 Id. The issue of what constitutes a reasonable time for accomplishment of the drilling
is closely related to the issue outlined supra note 68 and is explored in the same general
discussion cited therein.
7' According to a recent unsubstantiated report, Amarex entered bankruptcy proceedings
during 1983. Brecher & Lampert, Bill Simon's New Treasury, NEWSWEEK, Aug. 8, 1983, at
62.
7' Keller v. Commissioner, 79 T.C. 7, 9-10 (1982).
"' The investors' subscriptions were allocated to the drilling partnership, which was ac-
cepting subscriptions at the time of the investment. Of Amarex Drilling Partnerships
No. 72-73A, No. 72/73B, No. 72/73C and No. 72/73D, the Kellers' investment was allo-
cated to the last one. Id. at 10-11.
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ments. Each Program Partnership investor entered into a limited part-
nership agreement (Program Partnership Agreement) with the general
partners, Amarex and Amarex Funds, and as each drilling partnership
was commenced, the Program Partnership entered into a limited partner-
ship agreement (Drilling Agreement) with the same general partners.7 4
The Drilling Agreement required Amarex to contribute oil and gas
leases, equipment, and cash to the drilling partnership's capital, and it
gave Amarex Funds full and exclusive control over all necessary and/or
desirable business activities of the drilling partnership. The Program
Partnership was expressly precluded from exercising any power over
management of the operations of the drilling partnership and was, there-
fore, merely a "passive conduit" 75 which transferred the investors' sub-
scriptions to the drilling partnership and transferred the drilling partner-
ship's losses or gains to the investors.7 6
Amarex Drilling Partnership No. 72/73D77 (Drilling Partnership) began
its drilling program in August of 1973 and a total of 182 wells were drilled
under the program: 63 wells were completed in 1973; 94 wells were com-
pleted in 1974; and 25 wells were completed after December 31, 1974.
Both the Drilling Partnership and the Program Partnership used the
cash-basis method of accounting, and on its 1973 partnership tax return
the Drilling Partnership elected to expense IDC in accordance with I.R.C.
section 263(c) 78 and Treasury Regulation section 1.612-4. 79
In December, 1973, the Drilling Partnership transferred $487,869 to va-
rious drilling contractors and service companies pursuant to more than
330 contracts relating to 87 proposed oil and gas wells. It deducted this
amount on its 1973 income tax return as prepaid IDC pursuant to three
types of contracts: footage and daywork contracts;8 0 turnkey drilling con-
tracts;8' and third-party well-servicing contracts.8 2 No work was done
74 Id.
" Id. at 23.
71 Id. at 11.
77 See supra note 73.
71 See supra text accompanying notes 15-19.
" See supra text accompanying notes 16-19.
"0 Under these standard-form agreements, the total cost of the completed well is not
known at the inception of the contract. The drilling costs are based on a certain price per
foot of drilling and/or a certain price per day. See MILLER'S OIL & GAS FEDERAL INCOME
TAXATION §§ 20-22 (J. Houghton ed. 1982).
"1 Under this type of contract, it is agreed that the well will be drilled to a specified depth
for a specified total price, irrespective of the actual amount of time, labor, and materials
ultimately necessary to accomplish the task. When the drilling contractor has fulfilled his
obligations under the contract, the well will be ready for production and the owner need
only "turn the key" in order to start oil flowing. See W. DROLLINGER, TAX SHELTERS AND
TAX-FREE INCOME FOR EVERYONE (1977).
81 Under this type of contract, certain specified materials, services and equipment are
agreed to be furnished for specifically enumerated wells at fixed prices. The prices are, how-
ever, generally subject to adjustment if delivery occurs after a certain date specified in the
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during 1973 on 71 of the 87 wells for which prepayments were made. 3
Also in December of 1973, the Drilling Partnership transferred
$147,691 to the operator, Amarex Funds, as a fixed price for the supervi-
sion of the drilling of certain specified wells in lieu of the monthly rate
chargeable under the Drilling Agreement. Amarex Funds performed the
supervisory services, for which the prepaid well charges were transferred,
after the end of 1973.84
Finally, in the same month, the Drilling Partnership transferred an ad-
ditional $137,200 to Amarex Funds as a management fee, payable pursu-
ant to the Drilling Agreement. 85 The management services rendered in
exchange for this sum were limited to collecting subscriptions from the
individual investors, allocating the investments to the Drilling Partner-
ship, keeping the books, and issuing annual reports and tax returns .
6
In 1973, the Drilling Partnership reported an ordinary loss of
$1,373,257. The Program Partnership reported a $1,327,000 ordinary loss
on its partnership tax return as its distributive share of the Drilling Part-
nership's loss. 7 The Kellers, who also maintained their books and filed
their federal income tax returns using the cash-basis method of account-
ing, deducted $50,000 as their distributive share8 s of the Drilling Partner-
ship's loss on their 1973 return. 9
Upon review of the Drilling Partnership's 1973 return, the Commis-
sioner disallowed $772,760 in deductions claimed for 1973.90 As a result,
the Kellers' distributive share of the partnership loss was determined to
be $21,595 instead of the claimed $50,000. The Commissioner determined
a deficiency in the Kellers' income tax of $14,202 for 1973 and, faced with
having to pay this amount, the Kellers sought review by the United
States Tax Court.91
contract.
83 Keller, 79 T.C. at 17.
8 Id. at 21.
" The agreement provided that the "[o]perator shall, at the time of activating this Drill-
ing Partnership, charge the Joint Account for the account of the Program Partnership Man-
ager as a fee for its managing the activities of the Program Partnership an amount equal to
10% of Drilling Subscriptions for this Drilling Partnership." Id.
" Id. at 50.
87 See I.R.C. § 704(d) (1982). This section applies to the Program Partnership in its ca-
pacity as a limited partner in the Drilling Partnership.
" Id. This section applies to the Kellers as limited partners in the Program Partnership.
9 Keller, 79 T.C. at 12.
'0 The Commissioner disallowed as current-year deductions the $487,869 prepaid as IDC
to the drillers and the $147,691 paid to Amarex Funds as prepaid IDC for well supervision.
The $137,200 paid to Amarex Funds as a management fee was disallowed entirely because in
the Commissioner's opinion it represented a capital expenditure. The $487,869 prepayment
and the $147,691 prepayment could be deducted in subsequent years when the services were
actually rendered, but the $137,200 payment would have to be capitalized and amortized.
Id. at 26.
91 Id. at 8.
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V. KELLER ANALYZED UNDER THE ESTABLISHED GUIDELINES
Employing new standards, the Tax Court disallowed prepayments
under the footage and daywork contracts, the well-supervision contracts,
and the management-fee contract. It allowed the prepayments under the
turnkey contracts. Had the Keller court chosen to resolve the issues
presented by the factual situation under the previously established guide-
lines,92 it would have had little difficulty in reaching these same results.
In Keller 1) the prepayments were the result of binding contractual
obligations;93 2) the partnership held the operating interest in the
properties and had held it at the time the expenses were incurred; 94
3) the prepayment amount was the best estimate of the ultimate costs
calculated "by the combined efforts of technical personnel on staffs of
Amarex and contractors, '"' hence the result of an arm's-length transac-
tion;96 4) the payments were made to the parties who were to perform the
actual work;97 and 5) the contracts required payment from all the work-
ing interest owners.98 The court's resolution of the funds transfers to the
drillers and the funds transfers to Amarex Funds for well supervision
could have been achieved by using the legitimate business purpose
requirement."
Despite proferred explanations such as ensuring rig availability, 00 en-
suring commencement of drilling before the expiration of leases,' 01 lock-
ing in prices, 10 2 and ensuring preferential treatment, 0 3 the Keller court
specifically found that "petitioners [had] not shown a convincing business
purpose for any prepayments [by the Drilling Partnership] under any
footage and daywork and servicing contracts."'01 4 Under the guidelines as
they existed in 1973,105 the deductions for the prepayments for the foot-
92 See supra text accompanying notes 60-70. All of these guidelines had not been articu-
lated in 1973, however.
11 79 T.C. at 13. This limitation was articulated prior to 1973, when the Kellers made
their investment.
9' Id. These two limitations were also articulated before 1973.
11 Id. at 14. This was also one of the guidelines established prior to the time of the Kel-
lers' investment.
" Id. This limitation was articulated before 1973. By analyzing the payment of a manage-
ment fee to Amarex as a disproportionate consideration for the services rendered, the IRS,
using only the guidelines established at the time of the Kellers' investment, could have
found the payment not to have been the result of an arm's length transaction.
97 Id. This requirement was also on record in 1973.
98 Id. This guideline was, likewise, already enunciated at the time of the Kellers'
investment.
" See Pauley v. United States, 63-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) T 9280 (S.D. Cal. 1963).
100 79 T.C. at 32.
101 Id.
102 Id. at 33.
'0' Id. at 35.
104 Id. at 36.
'05 This qualification of the articulated guidelines is meant to include only those require-
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age and daywork contracts and for the well-servicing contracts would
have been disallowed, just as they were by the court in Keller. The pre-
payments to drillers under the turnkey contracts, supported by the legiti-
mate business purposes of locking in prices0 8 and shifting "the drilling
risk from the owner to the driller"1 0 7 would have created allowable deduc-
tions under the established guidelines, just as they were allowed by the
Keller court.
The court also found that the $147,691 transferred to Amarex Funds
for well-supervision charges lacked a sufficient business purpose.108 This
finding was made despite a showing that by paying the lump sum, the
Drilling Partnership paid less than it would have paid under the
monthly-charges structure contained in the Drilling Agreement. The Kel-
ler court dismissed this contention, stating "petitioner's post hoc argu-
ment concerning a lock in of price is irrelevant in our determination of
the partnership's motive for prepaying on December 31, 1973, because
the record clearly indicated that the lump sum was calculated to maintain
a price which had already been locked in." 10 9 The prepayment for well
supervision would have been disallowed as a current-year deduction
under the established guidelines, as it was by the court in Keller.
Finally, the issue arising out of the transfer of $137,200 to Amarex
Funds, ostensibly as a management fee, could also have been resolved by
simply resorting to established authority. As the Keller court stated, the
"Drilling Partnership's designation of the payment as a fee for manage-
ment services [did] not determine. . . this issue."' 1 0 The payment, repre-
senting ten percent of the total subscriptions, was paid to Amarex Funds
as the Program Partnership manager. In exchange for this amount,
Amarex Funds did nothing, because it had already been reimbursed for
all expenses incurred in performing this function."1 The payment was,
therefore, most probably made as compensation for Amarex Funds' role
in the organization of the drilling venture. "It is a settled principle that
expenditures for corporate organization are capital expenses, . . . [as] are
merger expenses . . . . Included under this classification have also been
expenditures incurred in the organization of a partnership.""' 2 Since it
was a capital expenditure, the type of fee characterized by the Drilling
ments of which the Kellers could and/or should have been aware at the time of their
investment.
1" 79 T.C. at 47.
107 Id.
108 Id. at 44.
I" Id. at 45.
"0 Id. at 48.
"I Id. at 50.
... Cagle v. Commissioner, 539 F.2d 409, 415 (5th Cir. 1976) (citations omitted) ($90,000
guaranteed payment made by a partnership to its managing partner not automatically de-
ductible as an ordinary and necessary business expense by the partnership, but instead
must be treated the same as if made to a nonpartner).
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Partnership as a management fee could not be deducted as an expense.
The Kellers and thousands of other investors presumably relied either
directly or indirectly on the standards articulated by the IRS and the
courts at the time of their investment in the venture."' It would, there-
fore, only have been equitable to resolve the issues presented in accor-
dance with those standards, without resort to any ex post facto additions
to or repudiations of them. It would have been reasonable to charge the
Kellers with notice of those requirements expressly enunciated prior to
the time of their investment, whether or not they in fact had possessed
actual knowledge thereof. Charging them with notice of requirements
pronounced at a later date, however, cannot be reconciled with any ac-
cepted theory of imputing knowledge.' 1 4 In no conceivable way can it be
argued that the Kellers did or could know, or even should have known, of
the nature or extent of later-established standards.
VI. THE NEW STANDARD
Although the Keller court could have resolved the issues using the es-
tablished guidelines without resort to any new tests concerning deduct-
ibility and could have reached the identical conclusions ultimately at-
tained, it refused to do so. It chose instead to launch the latest salvo in
the assault on the oil and gas drilling tax shelter by adopting a new two-
part test (the Keller test) for current-year deductibility of IDC. The new,
potentially-precedential standard espoused by the Commissioner,
adopted by the Keller court, and boding ill for the future resolution of
numerous taxpayers' cases, requires that: 1) the expenditure be a pay-
ment rather than a deposit;' 5 and 2) the deduction of the prepayment in
the payment year not result in a material distortion of income."'
The first part of the Keller test, that the expenditure must be a pay-
ment and not a deposit, while not previously systematically applied in the
IDC context, seems to have been an implied assumption supporting each
of the previously-established guidelines. The revenue rulings and court
decisions all spoke in terms of "payment," and no payment occurs unless
the taxpayer's money is "irretrievably out of pocket."' 7 As the Keller
"I If the Kellers had had actual knowledge of the articulated guidelines and had acted in
reliance on them when making their investment, they would have relied directly on the IRS
standards. If they had not had actual personal knowledge of the articulated guidelines, but
instead had acted in reliance on the advice of a tax attorney or the program promoter from
whom they purchased their subscriptions, they would have relied indirectly on such
standards.
"' In binding the Kellers to standards promulgated after the time of their investment,
the Tax Court is employing something akin to a strict liability standard for noncompliance.
"' 79 T.C. at 28.
116 Id.
"I Id. at 29. The court reiterated, "[tihe term 'payment' has a special meaning for tax
purposes. It does not mean a simple transfer of money by a taxpayer. A transfer of money
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court explains, "if by express, implied or customary terms, a taxpayer re-
tains a unilateral power to get the money back, then the money transfer
is a 'deposit' rather than a payment,""' 8 and as such, it cannot be de-
ducted as an expense when tendered. This distinction is based on sound
policy considerations. If, on December 31, a taxpayer could transfer
funds to another party under the guise of an expense and take a deduc-
tion for that year, and then on January 1 of the succeeding year unilater-
ally compel a full refund, the potential and incentive for abuse would be
enormous. The taxpayer could effectively shelter as much as his income
as he desired by tying it up for only one day at year-end and bear no risk
of loss whatsoever.
Under the new analysis, a failure to conform to the tax-related defini-
tion of "payment" was the major problem with the bulk of the year-end
money transfers in Keller. The footage and daywork contracts were exe-
cuted utilizing standard-form contracts prepared and printed by the
American Association of Oilwell Drilling Contractors and by the Interna-
tional Association of Drilling Contractors. Each of the contracts con-
tained a provision whereby the Drilling Partnership could stop work
under the contract and receive a substantial refund." 9 The provision also
provided for reimbursement of all reasonable expenses incurred by the
Drilling Contractor in connection with the contract and for a small sum
(ten percent) as liquidated damages. Because of this provision, at year-
end, the only portion of the prepayments "irretrievably out of pocket"' 20
would be any amounts already expended by the Drilling Contractor and
the ten percent damages amount. Similarly, with the well-servicing con-
tracts, "although no work stoppage or refund provisions were explicitly
included . . ., it was understood and agreed that the Drilling Partnership
could stop work at any time for any reason and . . . would receive, as a
refund, that portion of the prepaid amount which had not been earned by
the contractor.' 121
The "payment v. deposit" analysis used by the Keller court, while un-
usual in the IDC context, is certainly not a recent innovation. As the
court states, "that the expenditure must be payment rather than a re-
fundable deposit is a sine qua non for deductibility in any context.' '2 2
pursuant to a binding contract is also not enough. . . .A payment occurs only when the
taxpayer's money is 'irretrievably out of pocket.'" Id. (citations. omitted).
118 Id.
"9 The provision read in pertinent part that
the Owner [the Drilling Partnership] shall have the right to direct the stoppage of
the work to be performed by Contractor hereunder at any time prior to reaching
the specified depth, and even though Contractor has made no default hereunder,
and in such event Owner shall be under no obligation to Contractor.
Id. at 15.
110 See supra note 117.
"1' 79 T.C. at 16.
.. Id. at 28.
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The future systematic application of this analysis in the IDC area should
cause little inconvenience to future investors, as only a simple change in
the standard contract work-stoppage provision would be necessary to
make the sum transferred a payment rather than a deposit. Since the
"payment v. deposit inquiry properly focuses only on the unilateral power
of a taxpayer to compel a return of the prepaid amounts,"' 3 if the provi-
sion were changed to require the sum paid under a subsequently-can-
celled contract to be applied toward the completion of a different well
instead of being refunded by the drilling contractor, the sum, since "irre-
trievably out of pocket," would necessarily be construed as a payment."'
The more onerous implications of this "payment v. deposit" analysis
are obvious when viewed in light of those who invested under the previ-
ously-enunciated guidelines. 2  The contracts utilized by the Drilling
Partnership in Keller were standard contracts, prepared and printed by
two of the major trade organizations in the oil and gas drilling industry.
One can reasonably assume that these, or contracts with similar provi-
sions, have been in use by a large portion of the industry for a number of
years, and each one of the deductions created by prepayments under this
type of contract is now open to challenge and to disallowance by the
Commissioner.
The second part of the Keller test, the material distortion of income
aspect, is also a principle new only to the IDC area. It results from blend-
ing the second and third parts of the test postulated by the Commissioner
in the prepaid-feed context. 12 6 The Keller court refused to consider a le-
gitimate business purpose as an independent requirement because "the
two concepts are so inextricably interwoven that the material distortion
analysis mandated by [I.R.C.] section 446(b) must include a substantial
consideration of the business purpose aspects of the transaction.' 2 In-
stead of accepting the Commissioner's framing of the test, the Keller
court decided that the existence of "a substantial legitimate business pur-
pose satisfies the distortion of income test.' 28 Its absence, however, is not
123 Id. at 46.
... See Owens v. Commissioner, 64 T.C. 1 (1975), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 568
F.2d 1233 (6th Cir. 1977) (holding in part that refundability only in case of death, bank-
ruptcy, or insolvency of the recipient, does not make money transfers refundable deposits
rather than payments); Mann v. Commissioner, 483 F.2d 673 (8th Cir. 1973) (taxpayer's
transfer of money to seller for feed to be delivered in 1967 deductible as an ordinary and
necessary expense for 1966).
.. See supra text accompanying notes 113-14.
12 See supra note 124. In Rev. Rul. 152, 1975-1 C.B. 144, the test was stated as:
First, the expenditure must be a payment. . . rather than a mere deposit; second,
the prepayment must be made for a business purpose and not merely for tax
avoidance; and third; the deduction of such costs in the taxable year of prepay-
ment must not result in a material distortion of income.
Keller, 79 T.C. 7, 28.
128 Id. (quoting Van Raden v. Commissioner, 71 T.C. 1083, 1106 (1979)).
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by itself conclusive proof of a material distortion of income.
In future endeavors, assuming Keller is upheld on appeal, it would be
wise for partnerships wishing to avoid scrutiny for material distortion of
income to include in the drilling contracts an explicit reference to a busi-
ness purpose'" motivating all prepayments and to provide for prepay-
ment on all wells.8 0 Just as the court in Keller was unpersuaded by post
hoc justifications,' however, it is quite likely that a similarly disposed
court would be equally unpersuaded by self-serving pronouncements of a
business purpose. If some recited purpose is not sufficient to satisfy the
second part of the Keller test, then the transactions themselves will be
subjected to the material-distortion-of-income analysis utilized by the
Commissioner in other contexts.
The I.R.C. provides that "[t]axable income shall be computed under
the method of accounting on the basis of which the taxpayer regularly
computes his income in keeping his books,"'3 2 and that, as a general rule,
"[t]he amount of any deduction . . . allowed by this subtitle shall be
taken for the taxable year which is the proper taxable year under the
method of accounting used in computing taxable income."'8 3 This means
that "[u]nder the cash receipts and disbursements method of accounting,
amounts representing allowable deductions shall, as a general rule, be
taken into account for the taxable year in which paid."' 34 As with most
general rules, however, and especially with those in the tax area, an auto-
matic assumption of applicability can be disastrous, because most are
subject to qualifications. Section 446(a) of the Code notwithstanding,
I.R.C. section 446(b) grants the Commissioner wide discretion when "no
method of accounting has been regularly used by the taxpayer, or if the
129 Some recitation similar to the following might suffice: "As is widely known throughout
the industry, the acquisition, exploration and development of interests in attractive oil and
gas properties are highly competitive. Moreover, from time to time, drilling rigs, steel prod-
ucts and other drilling or field equipment may not be readily available, and competition for
such items may, therefore, become intense. Since failure to secure such items can under
certain circumstances result in loss of revenues and/or properties, the partnership will pre-
pay the contract price in order to ensure rig availability and to gain any competitive advan-
tage which could potentially arise therefrom."
It must be kept in mind, however, that such self-serving recitations have generally not
been very persuasive to the IRS. In the absence of other corroborative evidence regarding
the legitimacy and substantiality of the business purpose underlying any IDC prepayments,
it is highly improbable that any recitation in a contract will be sufficient.
"' The Drilling Partnership in Keller prepaid only for the drilling of some wells at year-
end. The remainder were drilled during 1973 on a pay-as-you-go basis. This inconsistent
action by the Drilling Partnership severely undermined the post hoc justifications offered at
trial regarding the legitimacy and substantiality of the underlying business purpose.
"' 79 T.C. at 45.
132 I.R.C. § 446(a) (1982).
I.R.C. § 461(a) (1982).
"' Treas. Reg. § 1.461-1(a)(1) (1957).
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method used does not clearly reflect income," 38 by providing that in
those circumstances "the computation of taxable income shall be made
under such method as, in the opinion of the Secretary, does clearly reflect
income."' 0 This broad discretion applies not only to the overall account-
ing method employed by a taxpayer, but also includes the power to
change the accounting treatment of any item which in particular distorts
income from the point of view of the Commissioner."' Most often this
discretion is authorized through the qualification contained in the trea-
sury regulations: "[i]f an expenditure results in the creation of an asset
having a useful life which extends substantially beyond the close of the
taxable year, such an expenditure may not be deductible, or may be de-
ductible only in part, for the taxable year in which made. " 8
By way of example, I.R.C. section 163 provides that interest is deducti-
ble when paid,3' but "prepaid interest has been a major factor in the
development of the 'material distortion' doctrine.' ' 4 0 In Sandor v. Com-
missioner,'" a cash-basis taxpayer borrowed $100,000 at a 7.5% annual
rate for a term of five years. On December 27, 1968, he paid $38,041, the
interest that would accrue over the next five years. On his 1968 federal
income tax return, the taxpayer deducted the whole amount pursuant to
I.R.C. section 163, but the Commissioner, concluding that the taxpayer's
method of accounting materially distorted his income, disallowed the de-
duction. 4 1 In effect, the taxpayer was forced to adopt the accrual method
of accounting for one item, the prepaid interest, because it created an
asset the life of which extended substantially beyond the end of the taxa-
ble year in which it was paid. Similarly, in Burck v. Commissioner,1 4 3 the
Second Circuit affirmed the Tax Court's determination that the Commis-
sioner had properly exercised his I.R.C. section 446(b) discretion in ap-
plying the accrual method of accounting to interest prepaid for a term of
51 months. 4 4 In Resnick v. Commissioner,4 5 the Seventh Circuit was in
agreement with the position "that there was no abuse of discretion by the
-- I.R.C. § 446(b) (1982) (emphasis added).
136 Id.
" See Commissioner v. Hansen, 360 U.S. 446 (1959) (accrual-basis taxpayers must in-
clude as income amounts credited to them in reserve accounts maintained in the books of
finance companies); Stephens Marine, Inc. v. Commissioner, 430 F.2d 679 (9th Cir. 1970)
(theoretical possibility of being forced to refund part of a payment under a contract with
the United States Navy is not sufficient cause to defer including the whole amount as in-
come for the year of receipt).
" Treas. Reg. § 1.461-1(a)(1) T.D. 6520, 1961-1 C.B. 52, 62.
"n I.R.C. § 163 (1982).
"0 Dixon, Timing of Deductions, 26 TUL. TAX INST. 1, 5 (1976).
14 62 T.C. 469 (1974), aff'd, 536 F.2d 874 (1976).
62 T.C. at 473.
1S 63 T.C. 556 (1975), aff'd, 533 F.2d 768 (2d Cir. 1976).
.44 533 F.2d at 774.
"' 555 F.2d 634 (7th Cir. 1977).
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Commissioner in disallowing the deduction""' 6 and in dealing with the
interest prepayment under the accrual method of accounting.
47
Substantially similar treatment has been accorded the prepayment of
insurance premiums' and the prepayment of rent. 4 9 In each instance,
the Commissioner determined that the prepayment created an asset fit-
ting the description contained in Treasury Regulation section 1.461-
1(a)(1);15 ° that, therefore, the cash-basis method of accounting materially
distorted the taxpayer's income; and that the accrual method of account-
ing would more clearly reflect income if it were applied to the item in
question.
Each of these items-prepaid interest, prepaid insurance, and prepaid
rent-involve "period" costs,'' and are, therefore, easily distinguishable
from the concept of IDC, which bear no relation to the passage of time.
As the Keller court acknowledged, "we cannot simply prorate prepaid
IDC as we have prorated period cost items [because] the prepaid [IDC]
do not entail 'period' costs. . . .Instead, the prepaid IDC is more akin to
... the concept of 'product' costs delineated in [the prepaid cattle-feed
context]."' 2
The IRS position regarding prepaid feed was solidified by Revenue
Ruling 75-152,"' wherein the Commissioner outlined the three-part
test" subsequently repostulated in Keller. The test has been widely ac-
cepted by the courts, and the Commissioner has attempted to invoke the
third part of this test"55 to disallow current-year deductions in the pre-
paid-feed context on several occasions, but to little avail.' The majority
"' Id. at 636.
117 Id. at 636-37. This treatment of expenditures for prepaid interest was finally codified
in 1976 as I.R.C. § 461(g).
141 See Rev. Rul. 413, 1970-2 C.B. 103; Peters v. Commissioner, 4 T.C. 1236 (1945).
"9' See Baton Coal Co. v. Commissioner, 51 F.2d 469 (3rd Cir.), cert. denied, 284 U.S. 674
(1931); Galatore Bros. v. Lines, 23 F.2d 676 (5th Cir. 1928).
See supra text accompanying note 138.
'' Period costs occur when both the benefits and the liabilities arise with the passage of
time.
"' 79 T.C. at 7.
1975-1 C.B. 144.
" See supra note 126.
" The third element of the Commissioner's test requires that the deduction "not result
in a material distortion of income." Rev. Rul. 152, 1975-1 C.B. 144, 144.
' 5 Commissioner v. Van Raden, 650 F.2d 1046 (9th Cir. 1981) (where substantially all of
the prepaid cattle feed purchased by the taxpayer was consumed within a one-year period,
taxpayer could deduct the feed expenditures in the year of purchase without creating a
material distortion of income as argued by the Commissioner); Frysinger v. Commissioner,
645 F.2d 523 (5th Cir. 1981) (cash-basis taxpayer entitled to deduct in 1975 the cost of
cattle feed purchased in December, 1975 for use in a 1976 cattle- feeding program, where
the prepayment was for the legitimate business purpose of obtaining the lowest possible
price and not merely for tax avoidance); Owens v. Commissioner, 568 F.2d 1233 (6th Cir.
1977) (holding, in part, that the cash-basis taxpayer was allowed a deduction for expendi-
tures made in 1964 for feed to be delivered in 1965 and that it would be an abuse of his
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of courts deciding the issue have ruled against the Commissioner because
Treasury Regulation section 1.471-6(a) provides that a farmer has the op-
tion of using cash-basis or inventory"' accounting in making his federal
income tax return. The Commissioner's invocation of Treasury Regula-
tion section 1.461-1(a)(1) in order to disallow the deduction of prepaid-
feed expenses and force the deduction of the feed expense only in the
year of consumption "would require the farmer either to inventory the
feed . . . or to maintain consumption records. 185 The courts have, there-
fore, almost uniformly 59 rejected these attempts because "consumption
records are nothing more than a backhanded inventory method . . . con-
trary to the historical concession to farmers . . .""0 of allowing "the
purchase of feed connected with raising livestock [to] be treated as ex-
pense deductions insofar as such costs represent actual outlays."' 61
As questionable as the applicability of Treasury Regulation sec-
tion 1.461-1(a)(1) is to the prepaid-feed context, it is even more inappro-
priate in the area of IDC. Keeping in mind the general rules of cash-basis
accounting, 6" it is obvious that the granting of an option to expense what
would under ordinary circumstances be a capital asset inherently involves
the sanctioning of a distortion of income, but neither the IRS nor the
Keller court accepts this. Instead, the court would allow the Commis-
sioner to exercise his discretion under I.R.C. section 446(b) to disallow
the current-year deduction.' 3 "The problem with the Commissioner's ar-
gument is that under Regulations section 1.446(a)(1) [the counterpart to
Code section 446(b)] the Commissioner is required to choose some other
method of accounting that would more accpjrately reflect income" 1 and
no other method would do so.
Under the accrual method of accounting, expenses can be deducted in
"the taxable year in which all the events have occurred which determine
the fact of the liability and the amount thereof can be determined with
§ 446(b) discretion for the Commissioner to order that this one item be dealt with under
the accrual method of accounting). But see Clement v. Commissioner, 580 F.2d 422 (Ct. Cl.
1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 907 (1979) (Commissioner could use Treas. Reg. § 1.461-1(a)(1)
to require the proration of feed expenditures made in one year for feed to be consumed
during the next year, in order to avoid what would otherwise be a material distortion of
income).
167 "Under inventory accounting, the taxpayer may deduct the cost of materials used to
produce the product only when the product is sold." Commissioner v. Van Raden, 650 F.2d
1046, 1048 (9th Cir. 1981).
.. Frysinger v. Commissioner, 645 F.2d 523, 528 (5th Cir. 1981).
," But see Clement v. Commissioner, 580 F.2d 422 (Ct. Cl. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S.
907 (1979).
160 Commissioner v. Van Raden, 650 F.2d at 1108.
'o' Dixon, supra note 140, at 11. See Treas. Reg. § 1.162-12(a), T.C. 7198, 1972-2 C.B.
166, 167.
162 See supra note 134 and accompanying text.
163 Keller, 79 T.C. at 38-39.
16. Owens v. Commissioner, 568 F.2d 1233, 1246 (6th Cir. 1977).
1983-84]
21Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1983
CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW
reasonable accuracy.' 65 In Cheroff v. Commissioner,' where the only is-
sue before the court was the current deductibility of IDC incurred by an
accrual-basis taxpayer in 1972 and deducted on its 1972 federal income
tax return, the Tax Court held that the contracts entered into were "suf-
ficient to establish the fact of liability and the amount thereof in 1972, ' '167
despite the fact that the taxpayer did not sustain the losses in 1972. Simi-
larly, in Keller, liability and the amount of liability were both estab-
lished; the losses were also sustained in the year in question. In the ab-
sence of a refund provision, it should be obvious that a change from cash-
basis to accrual accounting would not result in a clearer reflection of in-
come, since the prepayments would be deductible under either method.
Such an order would, therefore, not be within the Commissioner's
discretion.
The only remaining option for the Commissioner would therefore be to
exercise his I.R.C. section 446(b) discretion through Treasury Regulation
section 1.461-1(a) and to order that the IDC prepayment be prorated as a
capital asset with a useful life extending substantially beyond the end of
the taxable year. This option, however, is rife with conceptual difficulties.
Ordinarily IDC would fall within the ambit of I.R.C. section 263(a),
which provides that such expenditures must be capitalized and depreci-
ated over their useful lives as capital assets. 1 8 Regardless of the account-
ing method utilized by the taxpayer, only a certain portion of the total
expenditure would be deductible in any one year if it were not for the
option Congress formally granted through the enactment of I.R.C. sec-
tion 263(c) in 1954. This option to expense can be exercised "by claiming
[IDC] as a deduction on the taxpayer's return for the first taxable year in
which the taxpayer pays or incurs such costs."' 69
At the time this option was granted by Congress there were no hybrid
accounting methods authorized by the Internal Revenue Code. 170 It is be-
yond question that a cash-basis taxpayer who has incurred but has not
yet paid an expense at year-end must wait until the year of payment
'61 Treas. Reg. § 1.461-1(a)(2) (1957).
166 40 T.C.M. (CCH) 183 (1980).
167 Id. at 186. Prior to this appeal the Commissioner had failed to raise any other issues
such as whether the deduction in that year created a material distortion of income; there-
fore, the court refused to consider them.
"8 I.R.C. § 263(a) (1982).
69 Treas. Reg. § 1.612-4(d) (1965).
370 "A hybrid method of accounting exists where a single taxpayer computes income for a
particular accounting period by applying different methods of accounting to different items
of income or deduction within the particular accounting period." Weary, IRS Creation of
Hybrid Prepayment Methods: Prepayments and the Cash Method; Prepayments and the
Accrual Method, 35th INST. ON FED. TAX'N 59, 61 (1977). Such methods are now permitted,
although the "Code and Regulations do not use the term 'hybrid,' but instead speak of
'combination of methods.'" Id. n.1.
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before deducting it.' Likewise, an accrual-basis taxpayer who has paid
but not yet incurred an expense at year-end must similarly wait another
year before deducting it.' It is, therefore, a reasonable assumption that
Congress intended the phrase "paid or incurred" to mean that a taxpayer
who elected to use the cash method could deduct IDC in the year paid,
and that an accrual-basis taxpayer could deduct IDC in the year incurred.
This interpretation is strengthened by the very language chosen for Trea-
sury Regulation sections 1.461-1(a)(1) and 1.461-1(a)(2), by which the
Commissioner would seek to mandate capitalization of IDC. Under the
heading of "Taxpayer using cash receipts and disbursements method,"
treasury regulations state that "if an expenditure results in the creation
of an asset having a useful life which extends substantially beyond the
close of the taxable year, such an expenditure may not be deductible, or
may be deductible only in part, for the taxable year in which made,"' 3
while, under the heading of "Taxpayer using an accrual method," trea-
sury regulations provide that such an expenditure "may not be deductible
. ..for the taxable year in which incurred.' 7 4
The Commissioner's argument is, however, that by allowing what Con-
gress apparently intended, a material distortion of income results, and
that IDC should really be deductible only when paid and incurred and
when the services have been rendered. The same "substantially beyond"
limitation sought by the Commissioner, however, would seem to require
the implementation of I.R.C. section 263(a), which deals with the treat-
ment of capital expenditures in general, disallowing their deduction and
requiring amortization over their useful livei instead. This is true because
Treasury Regulation section 1.263(a)-2(a) defines the expenditures fall-
ing within I.R.C. section 263(a) as assets having a "useful life substan-
tially beyond the taxable year."'I7 For such items as prepaid interest, pre-
paid insurance, and prepaid rent, this causes no conceptual problems,
because normally they would not fall within I.R.C. section 263(a), but
would simply be period costs expensable when paid. Even for expendi-
tures in the prepaid-feed area, although it has been successfully argued
that capitalizing and then prorating the deduction is merely backhanded
1.. Treas. Reg. § 1.461-1(a)(1), T.D. 6520, 1961-1 C.B. 52, 62.
172 Treas. Reg. § 1.461-1(a)(2) (1960). See also Lukens Steel Co. v. Commissioner, 442
F.2d 1131 (3rd Cir. 1971) (credits to a contingent liability account were properly deducted
by the accrual-basis taxpayer); Natco Corp. v. United States, 240 F.2d 398 (3rd Cir. 1956)
(accrual-basis taxpayer's definite and absolute obligation to pay an expense is sufficient to
allow deduction of it regardless of whether the item is presently paid or payable); Pierce
Estates v. Commissioner, 195 F.2d 475 (3rd Cir. 1952) (reversing the Tax Court's decision
that interest paid in 1946 had actually accrued earlier and was, therefore, not deductible by
the accrual-basis taxpayer for 1946).
M Treas. Reg. § 1.461-1(a)(1) T.D. 6520, 1961-1 C.B. 52, 62 (emphasis added).
Treas. Reg. § 1.461-1(a)(2) (1960) (emphasis added).
'6 Treas. Reg. § 1.263(a)-(2)(a) (1960).
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inventorying,'" treatment as a capital expenditure would not be the ordi-
nary course. The ordinary treatment would be through inventory ac-
counting, to which I.R.C. section 263(a) has no relevance.
The IDC area is, at least in part, unique among this group, however. In
Woodward v. Commissioner,17 7 the Supreme Court observed that "[iut
has long been recognized, as a general matter, that costs incurred in the
acquisition . . .of a capital asset are to be treated as capital expendi-
tures.' 178 This principle, clearly applicable to the purchase of capital as-
sets, "has been applied, as well, to the costs incurred in a taxpayer's con-
struction of capital facilities.' 79 An oil well is incontrovertibly a capital
asset; therefore, IDC incurred in the construction of capital facilities
would be treated as capital expenditures under the general rules. How-
ever, mindful of the earlier warning regarding general rules,'8 0 the court
in Ransburg v. United States,' noted that "[w]hile . .. the basic fun-
damental of the Internal Revenue Codes of past and present is not to
allow the deduction of capital expenses from ordinary income but to off-
set such against capital gains, nevertheless the Congress can and does di-
gress from the fundamental when granting tax relief."' 8' When Congress
authorized the enactment of the option to expense IDC it was such a di-
gression. Without the overriding provision of I.R.C. section 263(c), IDC
would be capitalized and amortized under I.R.C. section 263(a). The
Commissioner now strives for the mandatory capitalization of prepaid
IDC through Treasury Regulation section 1.461-1(a), which again places
IDC squarely within the scope of I.R.C. section 263(a) as capital expendi-
tures, despite the express intent of Congress to exempt IDC from the pro-
visions of that section. The extreme conceptual defect in the Commis-
171 Commissioner v. Van Raden, 71 T.C. 1083, 1108 (1979), aff'd, 650 F.2d 1046, 1048 (9th
Cir. 1981).
177 397 U.S. 572 (1970).
178 Id. at 575. See also Georator Corp. v. United States, 485 F.2d 283 (4th Cir. 1973), cert.
denied, 417 U.S. 945 (1975) (legal fees incurred while resisting the cancellation of a trade-
mark registration constituted a capital expenditure); Helgerson v. United States, 426 F.2d
1293 (8th Cir. 1970) (litigation expenses incurred by the corporate majority stockholders in
a corporation in intervention in mandamus proceedings constituted a nondeductible capital
expenditure); Brooks v. Commissioner, 424 F.2d 116 (5th Cir. 1970) (the foreseeable excess
of costs over income in connection with oil and gas wells was deductible and did not have to
be capitalized by the working-interest owners); Great Lakes Pipeline Co. v. United States,
352 F. Supp. 1159 (W.D. Mo. 1972) (funds expended under salary assurance agreements in
order to induce key personnel to remain with the corporation during a change of ownership
had to be capitalized).
'79 Commissioner v. Idaho Power Co., 418 U.S. 1, 12 (1973) (equipment depreciation allo-
cable to the taxpayer's construction of capital facilities had to be capitalized under I.R.C.
§ 263(a)(1)).
'80 See supra text accompanying notes 134-35.
,81 281 F. Supp. 324 (S.D. Ind. 1967) (expense of pruning trees grown for Christmas sale
could be deducted from ordinary income).
82 Id. at 328.
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sioner's reasoning is thus laid bare when followed to its own natural
conclusion.
An area analogous to the IDC context and the I.R.C. section 263(c) op-
tion is I.R.C. section 174, which deals with research and experimental ex-
penditures. 3 Such expenditures are explicitly recognized as being capital
in nature in I.R.C. section 263(a)(1)(B), which provides that section 263
shall not apply to such expenditures which are deductible under sec-
tion 174.84 As Professor Boris Bittker has stated in considering this par-
ticular congressional digression from the general rule regarding capital
expenditures:
An accounting method that is explicitly authorized . . . by Con-
gress cannot be rejected even if the IRS, on sober evaluation of its
impact, concludes that it does not clearly reflect income. The pre-
emptive character of such statutory provisions as IRC [sec-
tion] 174, permitting taxpayers to deduct research and experi-
mental expenditures even if income would be more clearly
reflected by capitalizing these outlays and depreciating them over
their useful lives is obvious.185
Judge Goffe followed this same logic in his well-reasoned dissent to Kel-
ler. He stated that I.R.C. section 263(c) must be viewed as preempting
the Commissioner's power under I.R.C. section 446(b) because:
[T]he only way that an accounting treatment for IDC can clearly
reflect income is to treat such capital items in the traditional
manner . . . . This treatment is, however, contrary to sec-
tion 263(c) . . . . Admittedly, exercise of the option to deduct
IDC results in a distortion of income but that distortion has been
authorized by Congress.'
If Keller is allowed to stand on appeal, given its determination that the
Commissioner's power under I.R.C. section 446(b) can override the op-
tion granted to expense IDC,'8 7 it is likely that a similar assault will be
forthcoming against the research and development tax shelter. The same
reliance on what was presumed to be preemptive authority granted by
Congress is found in both tax shelters.
183 I.R.C. § 174 (1982).
184 I.R.C. § 263(a)(1)(B) (1982).
B. BITTKER, 4 FEDERAL TAXATION OF INCOME, ESTATES AND GIFTS, 105-18 (1981).
79 T.C. at 58 (Goffe, J., dissenting).
187 The majority in Keller maintained that neither provision overrides the other because
I.R.C. § 263(c) does not deal with the timing of the deduction. 79 T.C. at 39. This is disin-
genuous, however, because I.R.C. § 263 deals explicitly with capitalization and the option
granted thereunder is to expense or capitalize. The option is not merely to capitalize and
amortize for two or three years, as the Commissioner would require via Treas. Reg. § 1.461-
1(a), or to capitalize and amortize over the useful life of the oil or gas well.
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VII. THE ONE-YEAR RULE
The applicability of the Commissioner's position in the prepaid-feed
context to IDC prepayments will undoubtedly be appealed. As Judge
Goffe stated in dissent:
[T]he issues here should not be examined in the context of [Reve-
nue Ruling] 75-152. This Ruling does not constitute authority. It
may well be that the Commissioner would prefer scrutiny under
Revenue Ruling 75-152 rather than focus upon the case law and
published and private rulings which he has issued on the precise
question involved here because his position in this case is incon-
sistent with those rulings.""8
If the Keller test is upheld as the appropriate standard for examining
prepaid IDC transactions, a definitive ruling as to what constitutes an
asset having a useful life extending "substantially beyond" the close of
the tax year for the purposes of Treasury Regulation section 1.461-1(a)
should be rendered by the Supreme Court, as the circuits are not in ac-
cord on this issue.
In Zaninovich v. Commissioner, s9 the cash-basis taxpayer made a
rental payment on December 20, 1973 for a lease year that extended
eleven months beyond the end of the taxable year of payment. The Com-
missioner maintained that, since the payment covered a term from De-
cember 1 to November 30 of the subsequent year, a full deduction in the
year of payment would materially distort the taxpayer's income.'90
Through the use of Treasury Regulation section 1.461-1(a)(1), the Com-
missioner ordered that the payment be prorated; i.e., capitalized and am-
ortized, thereby delaying the deduction of eleven-twelfths of the payment
until the year in which the taxpayer received the benefits of the pay-
ment.' 9' The Tax Court agreed with the Commissioner, 192 but the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals rejected this approach and, instead, adopted the
"one-year rule' 9 s to distinguish between currently-deductible expenses
and capital expenditures having useful lives which extend "substantially
beyond" the end of the current taxable year within the meaning of Trea-
sury Regulation section 1.461(a).194 The court of appeals held that pre-
paying one year's rent was deductible in the year of payment because the
prepayment did not create an asset with a useful life which extended
'8 79 T.C. at 53 (Goffe, J., dissenting).
18 616 F.2d 429 (9th Cir. 1980).
,I0 Id. at 430.
191 Id. at 431.
192 69 T.C. 605 (1978).
19 The majority of circuits addressing the issue have framed the rule as requiring that
the expenditure not create an asset with a useful life extending more than one year beyond
the end of the taxable year in which the deduction was taken.
1 616 F.2d at 432.
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"substantially beyond" the end of the tax year. '
The Ninth Circuit's approach, although new to that circuit, has been
utilized in an increasing number of circuits for many years because "[tihe
overriding advantage of the 'one-year rule' is ease of application. [Also it]
eliminates pointless complexity in the calculation of the timing of deduc-
tions."' 9 6 The Fourth Circuit, in disallowing a taxpayer's deduction for a
portion of rental payments paid into a reserve fund, stated that "[t]he
issue to be resolved is not an unfamiliar one for on prior occasions we
have been called upon to determine into which category various expendi-
tures should appropriately be placed. [And] in Richmond Television
Corp. v. United States. . . we embraced the 'one-year rule' then followed
by the Tenth Circuit."' 97 Similar acknowledgements of the one-year rule's
value as guidance for courts in determining what "substantially beyond"
the end of the tax year should mean can be found in the First Circuit,' 8
the Second Circuit, 9 9 the Sixth Circuit,200 the Seventh Circuit, 20 ' the
Eighth Circuit,202 and the Tenth Circuit.203
The position of the Third Circuit, as illustrated by Schultz v. Commis-
sioner,20 4 is that the "distinction between an ordinary expense and a capi-
tal expenditure . . . is based on a factual analysis of the relationship of
'" Id. at 433.
'" Id. at 432.
'9' Jack's Cookie Co. v. United States, 597 F.2d 395 (4th Cir. 1979) (rental payments are
deductible only in the year in which they are actually applied for the benefit of the lessee).
.. Appliance Co. v. Commissioner, 349 F.2d 515 (1st Cir. 1965) (no deduction allowed for
the installation costs of leased gas appliances with useful lives of twelve years).
... American Dispenser Co. v. Commissioner, 396 F.2d 137 (2d Cir. 1968) (no deduction
allowed for payments to a competitor in exchange for a covenant not to manufacture, since
the taxpayer could expect many years of benefit therefrom).
200 Bilar Tool & Die Corp. v. Commissioner, 530 F.2d 708 (6th Cir. 1976) (upholding the
disallowance of a current deduction for attorney fees incurred in the reorganization of a
business).
.., Clark Coil & Refining Corp. v. United States, 473 F.2d 1217 (7th Cir. 1973) (affirming
the disallowance of a deduction representing the settlement of a nuisance action).
102 In a slight variation from the position of the other circuits, the Eighth Circuit stated
the rule as requiring the taxpayer to show that the payment did not result in the acquisition
of an asset with a life in excess of one year. Wells-Lee v. Commissioner, 360 F.2d 665 (8th
Cir. 1966) (money paid by osteopathic doctors as a "staff fee" in order to secure the use of a
hospital not deductible).
'03 The Tenth is the circuit which has most frequently applied the one-year rule, calling
on it consistently since 1950, when the circuit decided KingKade v. Commissioner, 180 F.2d
310 (10th Cir. 1950), which concerned expenditures by a lessee for repairs and maintenance
of a hotel that were held to be capital in nature and, therefore, not deductible. See Snyder
v. United States, 674 F.2d 1359 (10th Cir. 1982); Cincinnati, N.O. and T.P. Ry. Co., Inc. v.
Commissioner, 523 F.2d 137 (10th Cir. 1975); United States v. Wehrli, 400 F.2d 686 (10th
Cir. 1968); Connecticut Light & Power Co. v. United States, 368 F.2d 233 (10th Cir. 1966);
United States v. Akin, 248 F.2d 742 (10th Cir. 1957).
204 420 F.2d 490 (3rd Cir. 1970).
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the expenses to the entire transaction. '"2 0 5 This case-by-case approach
gives no guidance whatsoever to either lower courts or taxpayers.
The approach of the Fifth Circuit, as stated in Cagle v. Commis-
sioner,206 is that "[w]hen . . . an expenditure is made for the acquisition
of an asset the useful life of which will extend beyond the year in which
the cost is incurred, such expenditure is considered as a capital item, and
is not generally deductible as a business expense. 2 0 7 While this position
is preferable to the ambiguous standard of the Third Circuit in that it
gives clearer guidance to lower courts and to taxpayers, it is still some-
what ambiguous because, as the Supreme Court has stated, "many ex-
penses concededly deductible have prospective effect beyond the taxable
year. 20
8
The elimination of arbitrariness in the interpretation of ambiguous
provisions of the Code should be an earnestly sought- after goal, just as it
is in the interpretation of criminal statutes. Justice Douglas, in his dis-
sent in Commissioner v. Idaho Power Co., 20 9 pointed out the inherent evil
arising from the possibility of conflicting interpretations of such Code
provisions.2 1 0 He made it clear that he had no desire "to impugn the in-
tegrity of the IRS,' 21 but offered an example only to illustrate "the ca-
pricious character of how law is construed to get from the taxpayer the
greatest possible return. '21 2
While it is true that the IRS has a legitimate interest in trying to maxi-
mize revenue, it is also true that this should be accomplished on some
principled basis, and not by the individual agent according to his own
caprice. Uniform adoption of the "one-year rule" would help to eliminate
arbitrary disallowance of deductions and would give firm prospective
guidance both to IRS agents and to investors regarding the extent of al-
lowable deductions during the critical first year of a legitimate tax-shel-
tering mechanism.2 1
The adoption of the "one-year rule" would also create an equitable bal-
20' Id. at 491.
206 539 F.2d 409 (5th Cir. 1976) (holding that the payment by a partnership to its manag-
ing partner was a capital expenditure and, therefore, not deductible).
201 Id. at 415.
200 Commissioner v. Lincoln Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 403 U.S. 345, 354 (1971).
209 418 U.S. 1, 12 (1973) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
210 In Idaho Power, the Commissioner successfully argued that a vehicle with a useful life
of ten years, which had been used for construction of a building with a useful life of forty
years, should be depreciated over a forty-year period. Justice Douglas stated that he "sus-
pect[ed] that if the life of the vehicle were 40 years [instead of 10 years] and the life of the
building were 10 years [instead of 40 years] the Internal Revenue Service would [still] be
here arguing persuasively that depreciation of the vehicle should be taken over a 40-year
period." Id. at 12 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
211 Id.
212 Id.
2' See supra text accompanying notes 17-20.
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ance. Since cash-basis taxpayers are not entitled to take deductions in a
period other than when obligations for expenses are paid, even though the
benefits received are almost entirely attributable to an earlier tax period,
the one-year rule would serve "as a corollary to this imprecision in the
cash method."2 " " The "one-year rule" would be easy to apply and would
allow taxpayers to enjoy the simplicity of cash-basis accounting while also
enjoying the intentional benefits of options granted by Congress through
the enactment of provisions such as I.R.C. section 263(c).
The arbitrariness of setting a one-year rule cannot be denied. Any such
line-drawing is inherently arbitrary, but what the Commissioner terms an
"impermissible distortion in net income . . . must be distinguished from
the distortions in matching inherent in the cash disbursements method of
accounting itself."1 5 In the vast majority of prepayment cases "if there is
any distortion, it arises from permitting taxpayers to use an accounting
method other than the accrual basis. 2 1 6 To allow the Commissioner to
exercise virtually unbridled discretion in favor of some arbitrary notion of
what more clearly reflects income 21 7 is unjustifiable, especially when the
method chosen by the Commissioner comes no closer to matching the ex-
pense item with the income it will ultimately produce.21 " [1]f there was a
distortion of income in every situation in which an accounting method
did not precisely match items of expense and income, the cash basis
method would not be a permissible method of accounting, as a certain
degree of imprecision is built into [it]." 219 The cash method is, however,
and has always been an officially sanctioned method of accounting.
220
The Keller court did not address the issue of whether to follow the
"one-year rule" in the IDC context because "the parties did not present
"4 Bonaire Dev. Co. v. Commissioner, 679 F.2d 159, 162 (9th Cir. 1982) (upholding the
disallowance of a voluntary payment for management services to be rendered in the subse-
quent year).
"I Id. at 162.
216 Id.
2" In assessing the standards governing IRS determinations concerning what does or does
not clearly reflect income, Professor Bittker stated that "[tihe statutory phrase is not only
hopelessly vague but circular to boot, since the 'income' that must be clearly reflected by
the taxpayer's accounting method is taxable income, not financial, economic, or any other
variety of income." B. BITTKER, 4 FEDERAL TAXATION OF INCOME, ESTATES AND GiFTs, 105-19
(1981).
118 Only capitalization of the expenditure and the prorated deduction of it over the useful
life of the asset would accurately match income and expense items.
2" Zaninovich v. United States, 616 F.2d 429, 433 (9th Cir. 1980). See also Osterloh v.
Lucas, 37 F.2d 277, 278 (9th Cir. 1930) (cash-basis taxpayer not entitled to deduct the dif-
ference between the value of shares of stock borrowed for collateral and the amount realized
on the sale thereof by the banks on the taxpayer's default after it declined in value, where
the loss was not actually paid during the tax year in question).
,,0 The cash receipts and disbursements method of accounting was officially sanctioned in
I.R.C. § 41 (1939) and it is still specifically enumerated as an acceptable method in I.R.C.
§ 446 (1982).
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this issue for ... determination or provide a factual basis for ... consid-
eration of it." '22 1 Even if the court had been presented with the issue, it is
highly improbable that it would have resolved the various aspects of the
case differently, due to its initial determination, under the first part of
the Keller text,22 2 that the majority of the money transfers were deposits,
not payments, for tax purposes. Any definitive statement regarding the
Commissioner's power under Treasury Regulation section 1.461-1(a) and
the applicability of the "one-year rule" to the IDC context will have to
await a proper test case, 22s but with the Keller test as a new weapon in
the Commissioner's arsenal and with the IRS's long history of attacking
the oil and gas drilling tax shelter, the wait will no doubt be brief.
When that proper test case comes before the courts, there are several
underlying policy considerations which strongly support the recognition
of the "one-year rule." First, an immediate benefit would be a drastic
reduction in the number of cases presently in litigation. 224 By having a
firm guide, many of the pending cases could either be dismissed, if they
satisfied the standard, or settled, if the payment clearly violated the
rule.2 2 In addition, the prospective guidance afforded by such a rule to
individual taxpayers, tax attorneys, IRS agents, and the lower courts
would go far toward preventing the necessity for litigation in many cases
which under the Third Circuit system 226 would proceed to trial.
Second, as Congress recognized when it chose to grant the I.R.C. sec-
tion 263(c) option, the highly speculative nature of oil and gas explora-
tion necessitates compensatory provisions in order to stimulate investor
interest.227 Although under present conditions 2 8 it may be true that the
larger oil companies no longer require the added incentive to explore,
"[m]any independent operators . . . do not have the cash resources or
borrowing ability to absorb the additional cash requirements . . . caused
by deferring the deduction for [IDC]. ' ' 2 9 Many of the independent drill-
ers require funds from outside investors, especially from one-time inves-
tors seeking to shelter income in a given year. "[W]ithout the current
deductibility of (IDC], it would substantially close the door to outside
sources of funds for joint participation in exploratory ventures by others
21 79 T.C. at 40 n.24.
222 See supra text accompanying note 115 (liayment rather than deposit).
223 The proper case would have to satisfy the first part of the Keller test; i.e., any money
transfers would have to be payments within the tax-related definition. In addition, the
prepayments would have to have been under contracts which either did not contain any
recitation of an underlying business purpose or contained one which, in the opinion of the
Commissioner, was insufficient to justify the prepayments.
"I See Pineo, supra note 6.
21 616 F.2d at 432.
,26 See supra text accompanying notes 198-99.
22. See H.R. Con. Res. 50, 59 Stat. 844 (1945).
22 The change has primarily been the result of the decontrol of oil prices.
22. Webb, supra note 17, at 229.
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outside the industry."'2 30 As individuals are increasingly foreclosed from
entering the market, the market structure moves further away from the
freely-competitive economic theory which American society has em-
braced. Instead it approaches an artificially- controlled oligopolistic and
potentially monopolistic2 31 form.3
Finally, while the world market is currently experiencing an oil glut,
this is merely a transitory condition. Congress should not be misled into
abandoning its long-standing policy of encouraging oil and gas explora-
tion. Our dependence as a nation on foreign sources of oil places us in the
unenviable position of being at the mercy of powers potentially hostile to
our best interests.
VIII. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, it is not the ends achieved by the court in Keller which
create a new controversy, but rather the court's method of obtaining
them. Congress has for many decades encouraged oil and gas exploration
activities and has implicitly sanctioned the income distortion attendant
to the means employed as an incentive to encourage such activities. Any
drastic change in treatment should, therefore, be accomplished by con-
gressional action specifically addressed to prepaid IDC deductibility, as
was the case with prepaid interest, 3 and not by the Tax Court.
The Tax Court's departure from established case law and its discarding
of nearly two decades of published and private IRS rulings regarding IDC
deductibility in favor of the Commissioner's nebulous "distortion of in-
come" concept has the potential of working a great injustice on thousands
of taxpayers who acted in justifiable reliance on these unceremoniously-
abandoned guidelines. In order to mitigate this harsh impact, any imple-
mentation of the Keller test should be accomplished by a nationwide ac-
knowledgement of the "one-year rule" as the proper standard for differ-
entiating between acceptable mismatches of income and expense and
unacceptable material distortions of income. Such a uniform recognition
would aid in the equitable resolution of thousands of pending cases and,
in addition, would serve as a stable guideline for future investors, so that
2 0 Id. See also Klein, supra note 38; Doughtery, Operation of Section 1254: Questiona-
ble Recapture of IDC, 26 OIL & GAS TAX Q. 300 (1977); Burke, Jr. & Maultsby, Jr., Estab-
lishing Deductions for Prepaid Intangible Drilling and Development Costs, 28 OIL & GAS
TAX Q. 127 (1979).
' OPEC is a classic example of an oligopoly functioning for all intents and purposes as a
monopoly, at least until the latest round of oil price reduction talks, at which no agreement
could be reached.
232 The DeBeers diamond cartel is a near-perfect example of the ability of a functioning
monopoly to control the supply of a product artificially and, thereby, to control the whole-
sale market. See generally R. DORFMAN, PRICES AND MARKETS (1967).
233 See supra note 147 and accompanying text.
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more than the mere caprice of the Commissioner would control current-
year deductibility.
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